CIA RESPRESENTATIVE'S COMMENTS ON "CRUISE MISSILES: PROGRAMS, REQUIREMENT AND A

Created: 11/5/1975

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CENTRAL. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ' .

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rt- fht I'l'iji

erification Panel Working Group ,

CIA..Representative's Comments on

Missiles: Requirements and Alternatives,"nteragency Paper dated5

.1. All of the,options being considered for dealing with cruise missiles in SALT TVJO will present difficult monitoring problems. As indicated below, wo would probcbly havcdifficulty in determining deployment levels, ranees, and missions of cruise missiles. Given these difficulties, the CIA representative believes that decisions on cruise missile limit3 should be made primarily on the basis of other factors.

Monitoring Deployment

2. From the monitoring standpoint alone, thewouldotal ban on deployment. woulddifficult, but still easier to monitorprovision limiting the number of missiles orplatforms. .

'. Monitoring problems could "be compoundedSoviets were to develop small, long-rangewhich, like the proposed US SLCM, couldfrom torpedo tubes.. Deployment by thocruise missile launchers capable of containingor strategic missiles would create.

nce Capability

if the sovicte employe*

concealment measures in.cruise missile development, our estimates of maximum range could have considerable. ncertainty, even greater thanactor"wo or "th ree For tho purpose of monitoring rangoanfairly short;evel_ In .that case, .while wehave" difficulty in determining maximum cruise missileould be more confident that tho Soviets were not developing cruise missiles with very long ranges.

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Crui;n deteri It could be e; of ruconnaiss.

not depen-.prefarable, exchange remotcly-

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iinirtion which specificsonly nuclear-Armed cruis&'raieBllos-limited would impose another difficult monitoring task.

Soviet: ifiLr6ntions

6. Ke have no uvidencc of Soviat intentions to develop long-range cruise missiles. The Soviets hive tho technical capability to upgrade some of their present cruise missiles to systems of longer range at any time. They could develop more compact and accurateruise missiles in the. igh-priority program tbe Soviets could probably field advanced, lon?-rcnge cruise missiles before5 oxpiration date for thegreement. They might undertake either oC these options if they perceived that the US waa gaining an appreciable strategic advantage from its cruise misaile programs. esponse would not be automatic, houevftr, and the Soviets might instead seek to counter tho US programs by further improvements in air defence . r by upgrading other strategic offensive forces.

Original document.

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